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Political scientists have conventionally assumed that achieving democracy is
a one-way ratchet. Only very recently has the question of ‘democratic back-
sliding’ attracted any research attention. We argue that democratic instabil-
ity is best understood with tools from complexity science. The explanatory
power of complexity science arises from several features of complex systems.
Their relevance in the context of democracy is discussed. Several policy recom-
mendations are offered to help (re)stabilize current systems of representative
democracy.
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The Economist recently identified 80 countries whose democracy score declined during the
last decade, including the U.S. and some consolidated European democracies (16). Political sci-
entists have conventionally assumed that achieving democracy is a one-way ratchet. Only very
recently has the question of ‘democratic backsliding’ attracted any research attention. We argue
that democratic instability is best understood with tools from complexity science (18). Insights
from complexity science can facilitate the study of democratic processes and institutions and
the design of stabilizing policies.
This cross-disciplinary approach to political science rests on mathematical models of human
societies, built with tools from statistical physics, dynamical systems, complex networks, and
game theory. These tools allow scientists to focus on the salient features of the complex system
at hand. For example, Sinha and Pan (14) model the sudden rises in popularity of particular
ideas or products with the Ising model of ferromagnetism. This sociophysics model recovers
the long-tailed distributions observed in real social systems such as the outcome of elections
and the popularity of movies. The model captures how an agent’s choice can be affected not
only by interactions with other agents, but by how well their previous choice allowed them to
coordinate with the majority. Another example is the use of renormalization group methods to
illustrate the causes of minority opinion spreading (4).
The explanatory power of complexity science arises from several features of complex sys-
tems. Their relevance in the context of democracy is discussed in the following.
Randomness. Randomness of interactions is often important to self-organization. For ex-
ample, the collective performance of human groups can be improved by insertion of a few
autonomous agents that behave randomly (12). Democracy requires an unstructured exchange
of opinion and ideas between citizens. As David Runciman writes1: “[t]he randomness of
democracy—which remains its essential quality—protects us against getting stuck with truly
bad ideas. It means that nothing will last for long, because something else will come along to
disrupt it.”
Consensual norms. Chaos and collapse arise only when randomness increases beyond a crit-
ical level. Democracy requires a minimum agreement on norms and confidence in its institu-
tions. In their absence, democracy may be vulnerable to cascading beliefs about the unfairness
of the democratic process. Russian probing of the security of the US electoral system2 may have
helped trigger cascading beliefs among the presumed Republican losers in the 2016 elections
that the system had been ‘rigged’ by the winners. If enough people believe that the democratic
process or ‘establishment’ has been compromised, then the shared beliefs and norms that make
democracy viable may collapse. This collapse may propel people into accommodating ‘lying
demagogues’ because their brazen lies signal opposition to the disdained ‘establishment’ (6).
1https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/may/01/why-replacing-politicians-with-experts-is-a-reckless-idea
2https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/grand-jury-indicts-thirteen-russian-individuals-and-three-russian-companies-
scheme-interfere
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Such disdain for the ‘establishment’ may explain why Donald Trump can continue to rely on
his base despite a proven record of inaccuracies and misleading statements, and why support for
Brexit continues to be strong in parts of the British population notwithstanding mounting evi-
dence that it was based on false premises. Similarly, automated ‘big data’ techniques may make
human decisions more efficient but not necessarily fairer (1). Automated predictions about re-
cidivism, hiring, or lending often suffer from unfairness owing to what Joy Buolamwini calls the
‘undersampled majority’ in the underlying data3. Perceptions of such unfairness can accelerate
collapse of shared beliefs and norms.
Diversity. The more genetically diverse a bee hive, the higher is its survival probability (9).
Likewise, democracy can peacefully manage social relations by drawing on diverse viewpoints
that would likely be stifled in a less open setting. However, as with randomness, if diversity
is too little or too great, a complex system may become unstable. Publicly shared knowledge
about facts and problems, a form of interaction, may degrade to the extent that democratic
agreement becomes impossible. Degradation may occur through two mutually reinforcing pro-
cesses. First, sub-groups of citizens may create their own self-reinforcing knowledge structures
that are antagonistic to a shared knowledge base and potential agreement. These echo chambers
may result from selective sharing of information on social media. Although there is scientific
disagreement about their importance. Even so, if people interact only with like-minded others,
they may consider their beliefs to be more widely shared than they actually are. This may fos-
ter the emergence of a (falsely) perceived consensus, which in turn is known to render peoples
opinions resilient to contrary evidence (8). Second, the use of spreading misinformation as po-
litical strategy or to foster the interests of private individuals or foreign powers is reinforced
by the prevalence of the internet and social media (5). “Flooding” (11) of social media with
multitudes of quarreling perspectives, may increase the diversity of perspectives in the system
to an intolerable level, leading consumers of news either to political apathy, or to converge on
crudely simplified propaganda.
Dynamics. Dynamical systems theory underpins our understanding of ecological stability by
identifying basins of attraction an ecosystem may switch between. We cannot exhaustively
specify the basins of stability within which democracy can subsist although rough contours can
be identified. Early classical liberal claims that democracy could not survive because the less
wealthy majority would vote themselves benefits at the expense of the wealthier minority re-
main to be validated by history. Instead, democracy has been structurally constrained by the
need to placate wealthy elites. The dominant model in political science and economics views
democratic institutions as being ‘self-enforcing’ game theoretic equilibria and hence internally
stable. By implication, democratic institutions are thought to provide an external set of guar-
antees that foster more dynamic and unpredictable activities, but they will not themselves be
affected by those activities. Some game theorists have modeled dynamical properties of insti-
3https://ainowinstitute.org/symposia/videos/limited-vision-the-undersampled-majority.html
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tutions by analyzing social norms as equilibria in expectations, and applying this framework
to empirical public-policy problems in fostering and transforming norms. Stirling (15) applies
a more explicit and formal modeling technology, Conditional Game Theory (CGT), to social
choice settings, showing how game theorists can identify the strategic propagation of norms
through social networks. This approach allows us to trace both motivated and accidental ero-
sion of norms, and norms that are more likely to be resilient.
Precisely because it can treat social systems as dynamical systems, complexity science can
also help understand (a) the circumstances under which self-reinforcing pro-democratic patterns
begin to decay, and (b) how other self-reinforcing phenomena may arise in their stead. For
example, in opinion dynamics, minorities can have considerable influence, in particular when
they are perceived as consistent and competent (4).
Some argue that the consequence should be to restrict the dynamics and openness of a
system. We would instead agree with Tocqueville that “More fires get started in a democracy
but more fires get put out, too.” (as cited by D. Runciman).
Feedback. The role of feedback is paramount in any complex system. Feedback underpins the
pervasive ‘rich-get-richer’ phenomenon which often leads to highly unequal distributions (13),
be it wealth, links in a network, or links to web pages. Economic inequality readily turns into
unequal political power: increased wealth inequality allows wealthy actors to pursue political
changes to institutions which can in turn be translated into increased economic power. Evidence
is emerging that relatively few wealthy individuals, in apparent violation of electoral law, ex-
erted undue influence on the outcome of the Brexit referendum in the U.K. in 2016. Dispropor-
tionate political influence can also be wielded by unelected (and unaccountable) media outlets,
such as the tabloids in the U.K. If left unchecked, such self-reinforcing feedback loops have
the potential to transform a democracy into an effective oligarchy. Under some circumstances,
high inequality will spur unhappy citizens to counter-mobilize, leading to anti-inequality politi-
cal change. However, such a stabilizing counter-reaction requires sufficient political knowledge
and access to the public space (10).
Policy recommendations We can offer several policy recommendations to help (re)stabilize
current systems of representative democracy. (1) Entrench diversity by regulation. An in-
crease in knowledge of diverse opinion is needed to reverse political polarization. For example,
the Republic of Ireland has used citizens assemblies to design and support a series of referenda,
which ultimately led to acceptance of gay marriage and overturning of the countrys abortion
ban (3). Citizen assemblies that are composed of randomly chosen ‘mini publics’ and are given
ample time for deliberation and have access to expert testimony are likely resilient to the desta-
bilizing factors introduced above. Such processes of sortition are more likely to capture the
diversity of public knowledge than reliance on political elites (who tend to have similar per-
spectives). (2) Monitor feedback. Dampen or reverse the feedback loop between economic
inequality and political power by, for example, sharply limiting political spending and only al-
lowing it under strong transparency requirements (as is already the case in Germany and other
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European states). (3) Ensure connectivity. Publicly visible and comprehensible reforms to the
electoral system should be aimed at securing and demonstrating its fairness (e.g. with post-
hoc verifiable paper ballots) and individual citizens’ impact. An example is enhanced use of
the web by the Icelandic government to strengthen democratic participation and direct democ-
racy (17). Regulation of content to mandate balanced representation and objectivity (of the kind
already implemented in European democracies, and which applied to US radio and television
news before the 1980s), combined with transparency requirements for social media, would limit
knowledge fragmentation.
The complexity science approach recognizes the limits of top-down control measures, such
as (1)–(3). We therefore also offer recommendation for agents who seek reform via bottom-
up influence through self-organizing networks. (4) Recruit credible communicators in es-
tranged regions of the network. Self-organized groups need to consider not just the facts and
arguments they aim to get into the wider public sphere, but develop strategies to expand into
multiple sub-networks. For example, efforts to explain the broad social costs of the US prison
system only started to succeed when conservative elites who had been imprisoned provided
their perspective (2). (5) Recognize limits to message control. Advocates should promote
mutual acceptance that spreading influential messages through networks is not compatible with
enforcing rigid commitments. Self-organized groups should acknowledge the limits to con-
trollability of information flow and pre-identify how their messages can mutate in network
regions populated by initially disagreeing or opposing individuals. For example, knowing that
their private e-mail correspondence, released via Freedom-of-Information requests, would be
selectively quoted and disingenuously spun in predictable ways by climate change denialists,
scientists at the University of Arizona pre-emptively provided context for the e-mails to offset
anticipated spin4. This example should be generally emulated: influence groups should main-
tain awareness of the likely transformations their messages encounter as they travel through
distant and estranged network regions, thereby participating in reciprocal and dynamic opinion
formation rather than either trying to enforce endorsement of ’pure’ original message preser-
vation or being victimized by actors who may not always act in good faith. (6) Emphasize
persistence and limits to forecasting. Advocates should realize that there are no generally re-
liable metrics for assessing the probability that a message might become influential. Persistence
in advocacy can pay off since it may prepare, more or less invisibly, a network of opinions for
apparently sudden flipping under unanticipated, new conditions. Kuran’s model of ‘preference
falsification’ offers an explanation of the persistence of widely disliked social structures and the
occurrence of sudden unanticipated changes (7).
Our recommendations do not form a hierarchy. Their effectiveness is context dependent (to
spell this out goes beyond the realm of this piece). The recommendations are also not indepen-
dent of each other. For example, failure in recruiting credible communicators (Recommendation
4) increases the likelihood of failure in recognizing limits of message control (Recommendation
4https://www.theguardian.com/environment/climate-consensus-97-per-cent/2016/jul/07/climate-scientists-are-
under-attack-from-frivolous-lawsuits
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5).
Finally, we must recognize that democracy is an evolving project under ongoing construc-
tion, and that the currently prevailing representative model need not be considered final. An
active research community is developing improved democratic processes, with explorations of
numerous voting rules, such as flexible majority rules, minority voting, balanced voting, as-
sessment voting5. Complexity science offers an opportunity to examine the resilience of those
alternative modes of governance.
The time has come for complexity science to contribute to democracy. It offers diagnostic
tools for the evaluation of current policies, which can help us build more resilient and participa-
tory democratic processes. Our current circumstances demand that we harness the strengths of
randomness, diversity and adaptability within the complex social system of which our political
governance structures are a crucial component.
References
1. Solon Barocas and Andrew D. Selbst. Big data’s disparate impact. California Law Review,
104(3), 2016.
2. David Dagan and Steven Michael Teles. Prison break: Why conservatives turned against
mass incarceration. Oxford University Press, 2016.
3. David M Farrell, Jane Suiter, and Clodagh Harris. systematizingconstitutional deliberation:
the 2016–18 citizens assembly in ireland. Irish Political Studies, 0:1–11, 2018.
4. Serge Galam. Sociophysics: a physicist’s modeling of psycho-political phenomena.
Springer Science & Business Media, 2012.
5. R Kelly Garrett. The “echo chamber” distraction: Disinformation campaigns are the prob-
lem, not audience fragmentation. Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition,
6(4):370–376, 2017.
6. Oliver Hahl, Minjae Kim, and Ezra W Zuckerman Sivan. The authentic appeal of the lying
demagogue: Proclaiming the deeper truth about political illegitimacy. American Sociolog-
ical Review, 83(1):1–33, 2018.
7. Timur Kuran. Private Truths, Public Lies. Harvard University Press, 1997.
8. Z. Leviston, I. Walker, and S. Morwinski. Your opinion on climate change might not be as
common as you think. Nature Climate Change, 3(4):334–337, 2013.
9. Heather R Mattila and Thomas D Seeley. Genetic diversity in honey bee colonies enhances
productivity and fitness. Science, 317(5836):362–364, 2007.
5 http://www.mip.ethz.ch/research/areap/constitutionaldesign.html
6
10. Benjamin I Page and Martin Gilens. Democracy in America?: What Has Gone Wrong and
what We Can Do about it. University of Chicago Press, 2017.
11. Margaret E Roberts. Censored: Distraction and Diversion Inside China’s Great Firewall.
Princeton University Press, 2018.
12. Hirokazu Shirado and Nicholas A Christakis. Locally noisy autonomous agents improve
global human coordination in network experiments. Nature, 545(7654):370, 2017.
13. Herbert A Simon. On a class of skew distribution functions. Biometrika, 42(3/4):425–440,
1955.
14. Sitabhra Sinha and Raj Kumar Pan. How a hit is born: The emergence of popularity from
the dynamics of collective choice. Econophysics and Sociophysics: Trends and Perspec-
tives, (2), 2006.
15. Wynn C. Stirling. Theory of Social Choice on Networks: Preference, Aggregation, and
Coordination. Cambridge University Press, 2016.
16. The Economist Intelligence Unit. Democracy index 2017. Technical report, 2017.
17. The World Wide Web Foundation. The web and rising global inequality. Technical report,
2014.
18. K. Wiesner, A. Birdi, T. Eliassi-Rad, H. Farrell, D. Garcia, S. Lewandowsky, P. Palacios,
D. Ross, D. Sornette, and K. The´bault. Stability of democracies: a complex systems per-
spective. European Journal of Physics, 40(1):014002, 2018.
7
